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This paper examines the determinants of assets at marriage in rural Ethiopia. We identify and
test three separate processes that determine assets brought to marriage: assortative matching; com-
pensating parental transfers at marriage; and strategic behavior by parents. We ﬁnd ample evidence
for the ﬁrst, none for the second, and some evidence of the third for brides. We also ﬁnd no evidence of
competition for parental assets among siblings. Results suggests that parents do not transfer wealth
to children in ways that compensate for marriage market outcomes. Certain parents, however, give
more assets to daughters whenever doing so increases the chances of marrying a wealthy groom.
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Economic analysis of marriage and the family has grown tremendously since Becker’s (1981) Treatise
on the Family. Phenomena such as family formation, intergenerational transfers, and the allocation of
resources within the family, previously the domain of anthropology and sociology, have increasingly been
subject to economic investigation (e.g. Boulier and Rosenzweig 1984, Bergstrom 1997, Weiss 1997, Becker
and Tomes 1986, Behrman 1997, Haddad, Hoddinott and Alderman 1997). Marriage, in particular, is an
institution of great interest, since, in many developing countries, it represents the union not only of two
individuals, but also of two family or kinship groups (Rosenzweig and Stark 1989). Moreover, in many
societies, marriage is the occasion for a substantial transfer of assets from the parent to the child genera-
tion. Lastly, recent work testing the collective versus the unitary model of household decision making has
paid increased attention to conditions prevailing at the time of marriage. In particular, it has been shown
that the distribution of assets between spouses at the time of marriage acts as possible determinant of
bargaining power within marriage (e.g. Thomas, Contreras and Frankenberg 1997, Quisumbing and de
la Brière 2000, Quisumbing and Maluccio 1999). While it can be argued that assets at marriage do not
completely determine the distribution of assets upon divorce (Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2002), these
measures are, in themselves, worth investigating because they shed light on the institution of marriage
and inheritance.
In agrarian societies, marriage is an event of deep economic importance. First, it typically marks the
onset not only of a new household but also of a new production unit, e.g., a family farm. Assets brought to
marriage determine the start-up capital of this new enterprise. The success of the enterprise thus depends
on what happens on the ’marriage market’, that is, on the arrangement between the bride, the groom,
and their respective families regarding the devolution of assets to the newly formed household. Farm
formation cannot be dissociated from marriage market considerations. Second, in an environment where
asset accumulation takes time and is particularly diﬃcult for the poor, assets brought to marriage play
a paramount role in shaping the lifetime prosperity of newly formed households: well married daughters
can expect a life of relative comfort while poorly married daughters may spend most of their life in utter
poverty. Assortative matching between spouses — t h er i c hm a r r yt h er i c h ,t h ep o o rm a r r yt h ep o o r—
1not only increases inequality, it also reduces social mobility due to intergenerational transfers of assets at
marriage.
This paper examines the determinants of assets brought to marriage in rural Ethiopia. Two major
processes shape what newlyweds bring to the newly formed family unit: the matching between spouses
with diﬀerent assets, and parents’ decisions to endow their marrying children with start-up capital. This
paper seeks to assess the relative importance of these two processes in arranged marriages such as those
encountered in rural Ethiopia.
The importance of the matching process between potential brides and grooms was ﬁrst brought to light
by Becker (1981). In Becker’s work, a match (i.e., set of marriages) is an equilibrium if no bride or groom
can lure a partner away from a proposed union. Becker showed that this simple, intuitive requirement
naturally leads to assortative matching whereby the rich marry the rich and the poor marry the poor.
The reason is that rich brides can be lured away from poor grooms by rich grooms but the reverse is not
true. Since Becker’s initial contribution, assortative matching has been studied in settings other than the
marriage market — e.g., hospitals and medical interns, sorority rush, etc. (e.g. Roth 1991, Mongell and
Roth 1991, Roth and VandeVate 1990).
While marriage markets in developed — primarily urban — economies can adequately be described as
a pure matching process, this is not true for arranged marriages in traditional rural societies. This is
b e c a u s em a r r i a g ea l s om a r k st h ec r e a t i o no fan e wf arming unit. At marriage, parents decide not only
about the choice of a bride but also about with how much start-up capital to endow the newlyweds.
What they give nearly always constitute an advanced inheritance. When giving, parents must balance
the interest of the marrying child against their old age needs and the inheritance of unmarried siblings.
This means that, under fairly general assumptions, parents’ incentive to give to their marrying child is
a decreasing function of what is given by the spouse’s parents: if the groom brings a lot, the bride does
not need to bring as much, and the parents can keep more for themselves and their other children. The
end result is a ’compensation eﬀect’: if the groom brings a lot, the bride brings less.
Assortative matching and compensating transfers from parents thus operate in opposite directions:
while assortative matching generates a positive correlation between assets brought to marriage by both
2spouses, compensating transfers tend to generate a negative correlation. By itself assortative matching
reinforces asset inequality in agrarian societies — or at the very least enables it to persist over time. In
contrast, if there is no assortative matching, transfers from parents work to equalize assets brought to
marriage: a groom from a rich family married to a poor bride would compensate by bringing more assets
than a groom from a similarly wealthy family married to a rich bride. If the equalizing eﬀect of transfers
from parents were to dominate, the marriage market would have a strong redistributive eﬀect.
Transfers from parents can, however, work in the same direction as assortative matching if parents
act strategically, that is, if they internalize the eﬀect of their transfers on the marriage prospects of their
oﬀspring. The intuition is that parents may give more to their daughter if she can attract a wealthier
groom. If parents compete for attractive matches on behalf of their oﬀspring, the marriage equilibrium
again exhibits assortative matching: children of rich parents marry children of other rich parents. The
diﬀerence with pure assortative matching à la Becker is that assets brought to marriage then depend on
the ’slope’ of marriage prospects: at the margin, parents give more if it enables their child to marry a
much better prospect.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate these ideas formally. We investigate how rural society
endows new couples with the assets they need to set up a farm and family — typically land and livestock,
utensils, grains, and consumer durables such as clothing and jewelry. We ﬁnd that intergenerational
transfers take place primarily at the time of marriage. This is particularly true for men, to whom most
productive assets are bequeathed, whether at marriage or afterwards. We also test whether parents act
strategically. Results suggest that assets brought to marriage by brides follow a strategic motive. This
does not hold for grooms.
This paper diﬀers from previous work in several respects. First, we distinguish assortative matching
from assets brought to marriage. Second, we separate factors that aﬀect intergenerational transfers from
those that reﬂect the relative scarcity of brides and grooms. Third, unlike other marriage market studies
which focus on dowry and brideprice per se, that is, on transfers at marriage from one family to the other
(e.g. Rao 1993, Foster 1996), we examine the totality of assets brought to marriage, whether these were
acquired from parents or other sources prior to marriage or received at the time of marriage. This more
3inclusive measure is more appropriate in rural Ethiopia because gifts from the families to each other and
to the couple account for a small proportion of assets brought to marriage. The main purpose of these
gifts seems to be to seal the marriage and cover the cost of the wedding rather than to endow the new
couple. This lesson should be kept in mind when conducting marriage market studies in other (African)
countries.
Ethiopia is an ideal site for studying marriage customs, since it is characterized by extensive agro-
ecological and ethnic diversity. Diﬀerent religions, with widely divergent views regarding matrimonial
issues and the status of women, are well represented and tend to dominate diﬀerent parts of the country-
the Orthodox church of Ethiopia in the north, Sunni Muslims in the east and west, recently converted
Protestants in the South, and animist believers in parts of the south. The ethnic and cultural makeup
of the country is also quite varied, with Semitic traditions in the north, Cushitic traditions in the south
and east, and Nilotic traditions in the west. Climatic and ecological variation is equally high, given the
mountainous terrain and the fact that the country stretches from the dry Sahel to the humid equatorial
zone. Finally, local traditions have remained largely untouched given the lack of roads and the relative
isolation of the countryside.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework and testing strategy.
A brief description of the survey and the survey area follows in Section 3. Section 3 examines the determi-
nants of the value of assets brought to marriage by the bride and groom. We show that intergenerational
transfer considerations aﬀect the aggregate amount transferred to the new family unit. The distribution
of assets at marriage between spouses is analyzed as a function of personal, parental, and marriage market
characteristics. The last Section concludes.
2. Conceptual Framework
The starting point of our enquiry is a model of compensating transfers from parents to children at the
time of marriage. This model resembles a standard bequest model, except that interpretation is slightly
diﬀerent since the transfer takes place inter vivos. Let the assets brought to marriage by the groom and
b r i d eb ew r i t t e nµ and β, respectively. Without loss of generality, we focus on the groom’s problem.
4We begin by taking β as given and we focus on the choice of µ. Parents have initial wealth wp while
the child has initial personal wealth wc. Parents decide how much of their wealth to transfer to their
son.1 Let the transfer be denoted τ. Parents are altruistic and care about their own utility v(.) and that
of their marrying child u(.). Their combined utility is of the form u(wp − τ)+ωv(wc + τ + β) where
u(.) and v(.) are concave increasing functions and ω is a welfare weight. For simplicity, we assume that
u(x)=v(x)=xρ.S i n c eµ = wc + τ, it follows that τ = µ − wc and thus that:
wp − τ = wp + wc − µ (2.1)
Let the combined wealth of the groom and his parents be denoted µ ≡ wp + wc. We assume that the
groom’s parents and the bride’s parents transfer a non-negative amount to their children.2 This means
that µ ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0. In the context of rural Ethiopia, this is an appropriate assumption.3 The





[(¯ µ − µ)ρ + ω(µ + β)ρ] (2.2)
The interior solution to this problem has a linear form:
µ∗ =
ωσ
1+ωσ ¯ µ −
1
1+ωσβ (2.3)
≡ a¯ µ − bβ ≥ 0 (2.4)
where σ is the elasticity of substitution, i.e., σ−1
σ ≡ ρ. What parents give to their son is an increasing
function of their combined wealth but a decreasing function of what the bride brings to the marriage β.
1It is also conceivable that parents require transfers from their children in order to authorize marriage — and access to
lineage land (e.g. Lucas and Stark 1985, Stark and Lucas 1988). Our model applies to this case as well.
2This is equivalent to assuming that groom’s parents cannot extort payment from the bride’s parents simply to authorize
them to marry. One way to justify this assumption is participation to the marriage market is voluntary. Brides and grooms
can avoid extorsion by eloping.
3In our model, what parents give is used as start-up capital by the newly formed household. Even though there might
be exceptions, dowry payments in other parts of the world such as India largely fall within this general category provided
we include consumer durables.
5The bride’s parents solve a similar problem which yields the interior solution:
β
∗ = c¯ β − dµ ≥ 0 (2.5)
where β is the combined wealth of the bride and her parents and β
∗ similarly decreases with assets
brought by the groom. This is the substitution eﬀect we discussed in the introduction. In the population
we study, brides bring few assets to marriage. In the context of our model, this can be represented by a
smaller welfare weight for brides. We therefore expect that c<aand d>b .
We now examine the Nash equilibrium of the transfer game between parents. Equations 2.4 and 2.5
describe the behavior of the groom’s and bride’s parents when they both give and can easily be solved
jointly. The resulting equilibrium conﬁguration is as follows:
µ∗ =0 and β






















We are now ready to examine the matching process between all potential brides and grooms. We
assume all parents have the same utility and thus the same decision functions. By plugging equilibrium
values of µ∗ and β
∗ from 2.6 into the utility function of both parents, we can compute the utility of all
possible matches. Matching can then proceed as in Becker (1981). In general, there are many possible
matching equilibria. This is because zero β and zero µ create ties: a groom with initial wealth ¯ µ is
indiﬀerent between all brides for whom β =0 . To resolve these ties, we assume random assignment. As
is well known, the matching equilibrium also depends on who moves ﬁrst. For the purpose of illustration,
we assume that the groom’s parents move ﬁrst.
With these assumptions, an equilibrium match can computed by letting the groom’s parents sequen-
tially choose the bride that yields the highest utility. Parents with the highest ¯ µ choose ﬁrst, parents with
the next highest ¯ µ move next, etc.; parents with the lowest ¯ µ move last. When parents are indiﬀerent
between brides (i.e., they bring the same β), they are assumed to choose one at random. The match is an
6equilibrium because the bride married to the highest groom has a high combined value µ + β and could
not obtain a higher utility with another groom. Applying this argument recursively to all brides, we see
that no alternative allocation exists by which a bride and a groom would both be willing to switch. This
is because no one could guarantee himself or herself a utility higher than the one guaranteed by the above
scheme.
To illustrate how transfers from parents aﬀect the distribution of wealth across newlyweds, we conduct
a simulation exercise as follows. We posit values for ω and σ which are held constant across all iterations.
For each iteration, we select N random realizations of ¯ µ and ¯ β from a uniform distribution. For each pair
of realizations of ¯ µi and ¯ βj, we compute µ∗(¯ µi, ¯ βj) and β
∗(¯ βj, ¯ µi) using 2.6. We then compute the value
of this union to the parents of the bride and groom Ui,j = U(¯ µi,β
∗(¯ βj, ¯ µi)) and Vj,i = V (¯ βj,µ ∗(¯ µi, ¯ βj))
. We then recursively apply the algorithm described in the previous paragraphs to match all brides and
grooms. Let grooms be ranked by wealth so that ¯ µ1 > ¯ µ2 > ... > ¯ µN. We start by allocating to ¯ µ1 the
bride that gives utility U(¯ µ1,β
∗(¯ βj, ¯ µ1)). In practice, this is the one with the highest ¯ β unless all brides
contribute nothing (β
∗ =0 ) in which case parents are indiﬀerent. In this case, a bride is chosen randomly
from the set of equivalent matches. The matched bride is then removed from the list of potential matches
and we more to the next groom. The process is repeated until the last groom has been matched with the
last bride.
Table 1. Results of Monte Carlo simulations4
σ =0 .2 σ =1 .5
A. Groom: E[b b] Va r[b b] E[b b] Va r [b b]
model 1: µ∗
i = a + bβ
∗
i + εi 1.475 0.376 -6.402 2.047
model 2: µ∗
i = a + bβ
∗




i = a + bµ∗
i + υi 0.520 0.158 -0.234 0.083
model 2: β
∗
i = a + bµ∗
i + c¯ βi + υi -0.421 0.086 -0.734 0.077
The solution is a series of matched pairs {µ∗
i,β
∗
j}. To illustrate the contradictory eﬀects of parental
4These simulation results were obtained using 100 replications, each with 60 pairs of brides and grooms. Parental assets
¯ µ and ¯ β are generated independently using a [0,100] uniform distribution. Welfare weights are 1 of grooms and 0.3 for
brides. To avoid a perfect ﬁt, noise is added to ¯ µ and ¯ β afer matching using a uniform distribution [-5,5]. The true values
of b are -0.5 for grooms and -0.56 for brides when σ =0 .2 a n d- 0 . 5a n d- 0 . 8 1w h e nσ =1 .5.
7transfers and assortative matching on the correlation between µ∗ and β
∗,w er e g r e s sµ∗ ﬁrst on β
∗ alone
and then on β
∗ and ¯ µ jointly. In practice, we regress µ∗ on β
∗ and b µ ≡ ¯ µ + ε where ε is measurement
error. This is meant to capture the idea that the econometrician only has an imperfect measure of initial
wealth. Without measurement error, a perfect ﬁt is obtained in many cases, which is unrealistic.
Simulation results are summarized in Table 1 for various values of parameter σ.R e s u l t ss h o w t h a t
the simple correlation between µ∗ and β
∗ depends on σ. If the elasticity of substitution σ between
children and parents is high, µ∗ and β
∗ tend to be negatively correlated: the substitution eﬀect more
than compensates for the assortative matching eﬀect. In contrast, if σ is low, µ∗ and β
∗ tend to be
positively correlated. Observing a positive correlation between assets brought to marriage does not,
by itself, rule out the existence of parental transfers. Once we control for initial wealth, however, the
conditional correlation between µ∗ and β
∗ is always negative.
Suppose, in contrast, that parents do not make transfers at the time of marriage in a way that takes
into account the assets brought by the spouse. In this case, µ∗ and ¯ µ essentially coincide. Assortative
matching is the only force at work here. It ensures that high ¯ µ grooms are matched with high ¯ β brides.
If we regressed µ∗ on ¯ µ and β
∗, we would obtain a coeﬃcient of 1 on ¯ µ and 0 on β
∗. However, if ¯ µ is
measured with error, the correlation between µ∗ and β
∗ remains positive once we control for b µ.T h i si s
because β
∗ contains additional information about unobservables through assortative matching.5
A test of parental transfers at marriage can thus be constructed by estimating equations 2.4 and 2.5.
If only assortative matching is present, the coeﬃcient on β
∗ and µ∗ will be positive. If, however, parents
transfer fewer assets at marriage when the spouse brings more, the coeﬃcient on β
∗ and µ∗ becomes
negative once we control for ¯ µ and ¯ β, respectively. Estimating 2.4 and 2.5 forms the basis of our testing
strategy.
So far we have assumed that parents do not adjust transfers at marriage to improve the ranking of
their son or daughter in the marriage market. If parents act strategically in this sense, 2.6 no longer
represents their optimal behavior. Bidding by parents to improve marriage market outcomes must be
5We have µ∗ =¯ µ, β∗ = ¯ β, b µ =¯ µ + ε, and b β = ¯ β + ν. Due to assortative matching, β∗ and µ∗ are correlated, i.e.,
β∗ = m+nµ∗+υ.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,β∗ = m+n¯ µ+υ = m+n(b µ−ε)+υ, from which we obtain that −ε =( β∗−m−υ)/n−b µ.
We thus have µ∗ =b µ − ε =( β∗ − m − υ)/n: the regression only captures assortative matching, hence b µ drops out and the
coeﬃcient on β∗ is always positive. If β∗ is also measured with error, b µ may contain information that is not included in β∗
and may be signiﬁcant as well.
8taken into account. The basic structure of the resulting equilibrium is an auction-like outcome in which
brides (and grooms) bring to marriage just as much as could credibly be oﬀered by the next best bride.
This is best illustrated with the following thought experiment. Consider an economy with 2 grooms
and 2 brides. Order them so that ¯ µ1 > ¯ µ2 and ¯ β1 > ¯ β2. Assume that welfare weights ω are such that
brides bring less to marriage than grooms. As a result, brides have more to gain from switching rank. We
therefore focus on brides’ strategic behavior. Without strategic bidding, the utility of bride 2’s parents


























j,i are the assets brought to marriage when groom i is matched with bride j.S i n c e
¯ µ1 > ¯ µ2, in general µ∗
1,2 >µ ∗
2,2 and V2,1 >V 2,2. Other things being equal, V2,1 − V2,2 is an increasing
function of µ∗
1,2−µ∗
2,2: the more groom 1 brings to marriage relative to groom 2, the more bride 2 prefers
groom 1.
For simplicity, suppose there is no tie so that groom 1 strictly prefers bride 1.6 The question is
whether bride 2 can lure groom 1 away from bride 1. The maximum β
max
2,1 the parents of bride 2 would




(¯ β2 − β
max









2,1 and that β
max
2,1 is an increasing function of µ∗
1,2 and a decreasing
function of V2,2.8 In order to keep groom 1, bride 1 must bring just a bit more than β
max
2,1 .S i n c e b y
assumption, ¯ β1 > ¯ β2, doing so is less costly for the parents of bride 1 than for the parents of bride 2.
6This requires that β∗
1 > β∗
2 and thus that β∗
1 > 0.
7Strictly speaking we should allow groom 1 to adjust µ∗
1,2 but, for the sake of this simple presentation, this complication
is ignored. All we need is that µ∗
1,2 remains higher than µ∗
2,2.






−(¯ β − βmax)ρ−1 + ω(µ∗ + βmax)ρ−1
Since βmax > β∗ and ρ < 1 by construction, the numerator is negative, which proves the claim.
9The end result is that bride 1 keeps groom 1 but what bride 1 brings to marriage is now an increasing
function of µ∗
1,2 and a decreasing function of V2,2, the utility of the lower ranked bride.9
This heuristic treatment of a 2 × 2 case illustrate how complex the equilibrium is likely to be. What
is clear, however, is that the resulting equilibrium will not satisfy equations 2.4 and 2.5. With strategic
bidding, β and µ also depend on assets held by other potential brides and grooms. To the extent that the
econometrician does not control for this, it generates an omitted variable bias that, as before, generates
a positive correlation between µ and β even after we control for ¯ µ in equation 2.4. A similar problem
aﬀects equation 2.5.
In the rest of this paper we estimate equations 2.4 and 2.5 and we test whether the coeﬃcient on β
and µ are negative. If they are, this constitutes evidence that parents transfer wealth to their marrying
children in part to compensate for assets brought by the spouse. If the coeﬃcients are positive, this
constitutes evidence either that parents do not transfer wealth at marriage, or that they act strategically.
In the ﬁrst case, the relationship between µ and β in equation 2.4 is entirely driven by assortative
matching. In the second case, it is due to strategic bidding by parents who bid more if it helps them
match their child with a more richly endowed spouse.
3. Study site and survey description
Having presented our conceptual framework and outlined our testing strategy, we purport to apply these
ideas to marriage outcomes in rural Ethiopia. The choice of country is dictated by the fact that Ethiopia
is primarily an agrarian economy where marriage market issues are important determinants of welfare.
Ethiopia is indeed a low-income, drought-prone economy with the third largest population on the African
continent. While some work has been done on South Asia (Foster 1996) and West Africa (Jacoby 1995),
very little is known about marriage markets in East Africa. An additional attraction of Ethiopia as a study
site is that it has extensive agro-ecological and ethnic diversity, with over 85 ethnic groups and allegiance
to most major world and animist religions (Webb, von Braun and Yohannes 1992). This diversity should
9Since βmax
2,1 is a decreasing function of V2,2, in the case of multiple brides it is the utility of the lowest ranked bride
that determines βmax
2,1 .H o w e v e r ,ao ﬀer to give βmax
2,1 need not be credible in this case if the lowest rank bride could obtain
a higher utility at lower cost from a lower ranked male. This illustrates that the strategic equilibrium is, in general, quite
complicated.
10provide enough variety in marriage market outcomes to identify important determinants.
For our analysis, we rely on the 1997 Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS) which was undertaken
by the Department of Economics of Addis Ababa University (AAU) in collaboration with the International
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the Center for the Study of African Economies
(CSAE) of Oxford University. The 1997 ERHS covered approximately 1500 households in 15 villages
across Ethiopia, capturing much of the diversity mentioned above. While sample households within
villages were randomly selected, the choice of villages themselves was purposive to ensure that the major
farming systems were represented. Thus, while the 15 sites included in the sample may not be statistically
representative of rural Ethiopia as a whole, they are quite representative of its agro-ecological, ethnic,
and religious diversity.
The questionnaire used in the 1997 round includes a set of fairly standard core modules, supplemented
with modules speciﬁcally designed to address intrahousehold allocation issues, particularly conditions at
the time of marriage. These modules were designed not only to be consistent with information gathered in
the core modules, but also to complement individual-speciﬁc information. These modules were pretested
by the authors in February/March 1997 in four non-survey sites with a level of ethnic and religious
diversity similar to the sample itself. Data collection took place between May and December 1997.
Questionnaires were administered in several separate visits by enumerators residing in the survey villages
for several months. Careful data cleaning and reconciliation across rounds were undertaken in 1998 and
1999 by Bereket Kebede and IFPRI staﬀ.
The intrahousehold modules collect information on: the parental background and marriage histories
of each spouse; the circumstances surrounding the marriage (e.g. type of marriage contract, involvement
in the choice of a spouse); and the premarital human and physical capital of each spouse. A variety
of assets brought to the marriage were recorded, as well as all transfers made at the time of marriage.
These questions, which were asked separately for each union listed by the household head, pertained to
assets brought to marriage by the head and his spouse(s) (or if the household head was female, for herself
and her last husband). Questions were as exhaustive as possible; they covered the value and quantity of
land and livestock, as well as the value of jewelry, linen, clothing, grains, and utensils that each spouse
11brought to marriage. In the analysis, values at the time of marriage are converted to current values
using the consumer price index. Given the diﬃculties inherent in a long recall period and in the choice
of an inﬂation correction factor suitable for all 15 villages, these values are likely to be measured with
error. We also collected information on the value of the house brought to marriage by each spouse, if
any. Although questions were asked about cash as well, they yielded very few responses, if any. This
is because accumulation in the form of cash or ﬁnancial instruments is essentially absent in the study
area. Questions were asked about transfers from the bride’s and groom’s families at the time of marriage,
whether to the couple, or to a speciﬁc individual. Parental background information was collected for each
spouse and each union; these included landholdings of the parents at the time the household head was
married, as well as educational attainment of each parent of each spouse. Human capital characteristics
of each spouse included age, education, and experience in three categories of work prior to marriage:
farm work, wage work, and self-employment.
One asset, land, deserves a few words of caution. For some twenty years prior to the survey, rural land
was owned by the Ethiopian state and distributed to individual farmers by the Peasants’ Association (PA),
a local authority operating at the village level. Land is then periodically reallocated between farmers
to accommodate the needs of young couples. Between these reallocations, farmers hold full user rights
on the land. In practice, reallocations have occurred rather infrequently. Diﬀerent regions also seem
to have interpreted the law diﬀerently, some opting for a collectivist approach while others essentially
followed the old system of inheritance (e.g. The World Bank 1998, Gopal and Salim 1999). Young couples
typically obtain land through their parents, either directly (gift or land loan) or indirectly by having their
parents lobby the PA. It is also worth noting that, although the sale of agricultural land has been illegal
in Ethiopia for over twenty years, virtually all surveyed households were able to value the land they had
brought to marriage. This leads us to expect that, in rural Ethiopia, parents continue to determine the
land base of newly formed couples.
Table 2 breaks down the sample by household category. We see that twenty percent of surveyed
households are headed by unmarried individuals, most often divorced or widowed women. Monogamous
couples living together represent some 62% of the sample. Polygamous households — or parts thereof —
12account for 7.6% of the sample, while separated couples account for the remaining 9%. Starting from
these household level data, we construct a marriage data set that contains information recorded for each
union separately. The rest of the analysis presented here is based on this union-level data set.
Survey results show that grooms bring nearly ten times more assets than brides to the newly formed
family unit (Table 3), an average of 4,270 Birr (in 1997 prices), compared to 430 birr for brides. For
grooms, land is the asset with the highest average value. The next most valuable asset is livestock,
followed by grain stocks and other minor assets. In contrast, brides bring very little land to the marriage.
They bring some livestock but less than grooms. Two-thirds of the brides report bringing no asset to
marriage. Gifts at the time of marriage are distributed more evenly between the groom and the bride but
they are very small relative to assets brought to marriage, except for the bride where they are roughly
equivalent. The survey area can thus be described as a system where grooms bring most of the start-up
capital of the newly formed household.
4. Estimation results
We are now ready to proceed with estimation of equations 2.4 and 2.5. For a couple with husband i and
wife j, the model to be estimated is of the form:
µi = ai¯ µi + biβj + ui ≥ 0 (4.1)





i , bi = −1
1+ωσ




j ,a n db = −1
1+ωσ
j . To capture the fact that parents give much less
to brides than to grooms, we let welfare weights diﬀer for brides and grooms.
From equation 2.1, we know that µi ≡ w
p
i + wc
i. We measure parental wealth w
p
i using land owned
by parents and father’s education. To avoid spurious correlation, we measure wc
i primarily in terms
of human capital: schooling, age at marriage, and work experience at marriage. These variables are
predetermined and are not aﬀected by compensating parental transfers at the time of marriage. We
also include the number of previous marriages because we suspect that they aﬀect asset accumulation
13before a new marriage, particularly for women. The dependent variables µi and βj are the value of all
assets brought to marriage by the bride and the groom; they are constructed as described in the previous
section. They include the value of all the physical assets that form the start-up capital of the newly
created household.
Sample correlation coeﬃcients between µi and βj are signiﬁc a n t l yp o s i t i v e . T h i si sc o n s i s t e n tw i t h
assortative matching and does not support the idea of compensating parental transfers with a large value
of σ. To test compensating transfers, it is therefore necessary to rely on equations 4.1 and 4.2. Regression
estimates are reported in Table 4. The model is estimated in levels, as stipulated in equations 4.1 and
4.2. As a robustness check, we also estimate the model in logs, in which case the dependent variable
as well as assets brought by the spouse and father’s land enters the regression in log. The estimator is
tobit.10
Dummies are included for each village. Because we suspect village eﬀects to vary over time, we cross
village dummies with the decade in which the marriage took place. Decades are calculated from the time
of the survey, i.e., 1997. So, marriages in village 1 taking place between 1988 and 1997 have one dummy,
while marriages in the same village taking place between 1978 and 1987 have another dummy variable.
A total of 15 × 4=6 0dummies is included in the regressions.
Estimation results are broadly consistent across the model in level and in logs but the model in log
provides a better ﬁt. We obtain large positive values for bi and dj,b o t hi nl e v e l sa n di nl o g s . T h i s
constitutes prima facie rejection of the compensating transfers model presented in Section 2. Parental
land has a positive eﬀect on assets brought to marriage by both bride and groom while parental education
has no eﬀect. Age and the number of previous unions in general have a positive eﬀect on assets brought
to marriage, reﬂecting individual accumulation by the spouses. Experience in wage work is negative for
men, suggesting that men who work for a wage are less capable to accumulate assets than farmers.
Parents presumably divide their assets among their children so that, other things being equal, grooms
with more brothers and sisters should receive less. Competition among siblings may be correlated with
matching outcomes in such a way as to invalidate our results. To test for this possibility, we reestimate
10Similar results are obtained using censored least-absolute deviation regressions, but village-decade dummies make
estimation diﬃcult. In the log model, assets at marriage appear as log(µi +1 )and log(βi +1 ) .
14the model with sibling eﬀects. We assume that welfare weights vary as a function of the number of
siblings. In practice, this means that ai and bi vary systematically with the number of siblings of the
groom. This eﬀect is captured by including cross terms between number of siblings and ¯ µi and βj.T h e
same apply to brides. Because daughters bring much less to marriage, we focus on competition with
brothers.11 To keep the model sparse, we only include the most important cross terms.
Results with sibling eﬀects are presented in Table 5. As expected, in the level regression we ﬁnd that
parental land crossed with number of siblings has a negative sign for grooms. This means that grooms
with more brothers receive less from their parents. The eﬀect is not signiﬁcant, however. Contrary to
expectations, we ﬁnd that βj and µi crossed with siblings have positive signs: spouses with more siblings
bring more to marriage if their spouse brings more. We cannot think of a reasonable explanation for this
result other than a assortative matching eﬀect: grooms with more siblings have more wealth and are thus
attract brides with more wealth. Except for the groom regression in levels, however, sibling eﬀects are
neither individually or jointly signiﬁcant.
For inference based on equations 4.1 and 4.2 to yield correct conclusions, ¯ µi and ¯ βj must not be
measured with error. Matching on unobservables in the marriage market ensures that assets brought
by the bride are positively correlated with unobservable assets of the groom. The presence of errors of
measurement in ¯ µi therefore biases the coeﬃcient of βi in 4.1. Whenever the dependent variable µi and
regressor βj are positively correlated because of matching on unobservables, the coeﬃcient of βj is biased
toward a positive value. The same thing happens for µi in equation 4.2. For our test to be conclusive, it
is therefore necessary to instrument βj and µi in their respective regression.
In order to instrument βj in equation 4.1 we need regressors that help predict assets brought to
marriage by the bride E[βj] but are independent of unobservable characteristics of groom i.F o r t h i s
purpose, we rely on the fact that assortative matching varies across villages and over time: grooms with
similar observable characteristics in diﬀerent villages are matched with brides with diﬀerent wealth. Not
only is the level diﬀerent, but also the slope of the assortative matching relationship. It is this diﬀerence
in slopes that we use to instrument βj. The validity of this instrumentation procedure rests on the
11We also experimented with the number of sisters, but they are never signiﬁcant.
15assumption that the slope of parental behavior does not vary across villages and time periods. We feel
this is a reasonable assumption given the data at hand and our desire to identify behavior that is robust
across villages.
Results with instrumented b βj and b µi are reported in Table 6. Other regressors are unchanged. We
a g a i no b t a i nas t r o n gp o s i t i v ee s t i m a t e dc o e ﬃcients for bi and dj in the levels regression, hence rejecting
the compensating parental transfer model without strategic behavior. Results in logs still show a positive
relationship but the coeﬃcient is no longer signiﬁcant. As discussed in Section 2, there are two potential
interpretations for these positive coeﬃcients: either (1) all we observe is due to assortative matching;
parental transfers do not serve a compensating role; or (2) parents act strategically. In Section 3 we
have seen that parents do transfer wealth to their children at marriage. This constitutes circumstantial
evidence against the ﬁrst interpretation. It remains conceivable, however, that parents endow their
children prior to marriage and do not adjust their transfer after marriage market outcomes are realized.
5. Testing strategic behavior
To try to disentangle the two explanations, we construct a test of strategic behavior. This test is based
on the idea that, if parents act strategically, the slope of expected marriage market outcomes should
aﬀect their behavior. The intuition behind this idea is that strategic parents transfer more if doing so
dramatically increases the quality of the match for their child. This is equivalent to saying that parents
adjust their transfers not only in response to assets brought by the spouse but also in response to how
easily they can obtain a better match.
To show this formally, we amend the parental transfer model to include a slope eﬀect. Let the
conditional expected match be written:
E[β|µ]=g(µ) (5.1)
In contrast with the compensating transfer model, we now assume that parents do not take β as given





[(¯ µ − µ)ρ + ω(µ + g(µ))ρ]
16Solving the ﬁrst order condition yields a modiﬁed equation 2.4:
µ∗ =
(1 + g0(µ))σωσ¯ µ − β
o + g0(µ)µo
1+g0(µ)+( 1+g0(µ))σωσ ≥ 0 (5.2)
A similar condition can be derived from brides.
To transform equation 5.2 into a relationship that can be used estimation purposes, we take a ﬁrst-
order Taylor approximation of g(µ) around {µo,β
o}:
g(µ) ' β
o + g0(µo)(µ − µo) (5.3)
We think of equation 5.1 as a local linear approximation to the true matching relationship around the
parental optimum with µ∗ = µo and β = β
o.T h e t e r m g0(µ∗) measures the slope of the matching
relationship at µ∗. To simplify the notation, let κ stand for g0(µ∗), keeping in mind that κ varies across
individuals depending on the marriage market they face. Equation 5.2 can then be rewritten as:
µ∗ =




1+( 1+κ)σωσ − β
1
1+( 1+κ)σωσ (5.4)
which again is linear in ¯ µ and β.T h e o n l y d i ﬀerence is the presence of the (1 + κ)σ term. When the
matching function is steep and κ is large, parents can signiﬁcantly improve their child’s marriage prospect
by giving more: the coeﬃcient of ¯ µ increases in κ while the coeﬃcient of β decreases. Given an estimate




1+(1+κ)σωσ can easily be approximated by a log-linear function in κ.
To estimate 5.4, we need an individual-speciﬁce s t i m a t eo fκ, the slope of the matching relationship.
If parents form rational expectations, E[β|µ] is equal to the actual matching relationship. It is therefore
possible to obtain an approximation to the local curvature of E[β|µ] from the empirical matching rela-
tionship. With this idea as starting point, we proceed as follows. We ﬁrst generate a non-parametric
estimate of E[βj|µi] by ﬁtting a kernel regression separately for each village. Let this estimate be written
17β
e
j. This estimate is then used in combination with µi pairs to compute local slopes.12
Before being used in 5.4, the resulting slope estimates ﬁnally need to be purged from endogeneity bias.
The reason is that β
e
j and hence slopes were calculated on the basis of the dependent variable µi.T h i s
generates the possibility of spurious correlation if higher values of µi are associated with steeper slopes.
To eliminate this bias, we instrument β
e
j ( o rr a t h e ri t sl o g )u s i n g¯ µi separately for each village-decade
group. As a whole, this approach guarantees that we only using information about individual assets in
constructing our estimate of the slope of E[β|µ], not information about the actual match.13
Estimation results for 5.4 using these slopes are presented in Table 7. Results are quite diﬀerent for
brides and grooms. For grooms, slope eﬀects are negative and non-signiﬁcant. The value of assets brought
by the bride has a positive coeﬃcient, although as in Table 6 the signiﬁcance of this coeﬃcient drops
below standard levels in the log regression. In contrast, for brides the instrumented slope variable has a
strongly signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient, while the coeﬃcient on assets brought by the husband becomes
non-signiﬁcant and, in the log regression, negative.
These results indicate that strategic behavior may be present, but only with respect what parents give
to brides. Regarding grooms, the bulk of the evidence suggests that assets brought to marriage are not
aﬀected by marriage market outcomes except via assortative matching. For brides, there is some evidence
that certain parents give more to their daughter to improve their marriage prospects, as predicted by our
model with strategic behavior. But we ﬁnd no strong evidence that parents reduce transfers to daughters
at marriage in view of their realized match.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that, contrary to the compensating transfer model presented in
Section 2, parents do not take marriage market outcomes into account when they set the assets brought
to marriage by their child. It is as if parents ﬁrst decide how much to endow their child, and then
look for a marriage prospect. As a result, the data reﬂects primarily assortative matching. The only
12The kernel regression is calculated for each village separately using a least squares Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth
of 0.8. For most points, slopes are computed by linear interpolation using the two nearest neighbors. For extremum
observations, we use only a single nearest neighbor. For ranked observations with zero assets brought by spouse, the slope
is set to zero. For ranked observations with zero assets brought by individual, the expected assets brought by the spouse is
the average assets over all individuals with zero assets. In this case, the slope is calculated relative to the nearest neighbor
with strictly positive assets brought by spouse. For villages with no variation, the slope is zero. These observations do not
aﬀect estimation of 5.4 because of the inclusion of village-decade dummies.
13Because of the presence of noise in the data, predicted values b β
e
j occasionally take negative values. Such values seem
to suggest that parents could improve marriage market outcomes by transfering less, something we ﬁnd extremely unlikely.
For this reason, we set all negative values of b β
e
j to 0.
18exception concerns brides. Certain parents appear to give more assets to their daughter whenever doing
so dramatically improves their marriage outcome.
6. Conclusion
We have examined the determinants of assets brought to marriage. These determinants indeed shape
the distribution of assets and incomes in agrarian societies characterized by widespread poverty — hence
where it is diﬃcult to accumulate. Assets at marriage also aﬀect farm size distribution since newlyweds
typically initiate their own, separate farming operations. Assets brought at marriage thus constitute the
dominant form of start-up capital for new farms.
Using a simple model of parental transfers (inter vivos bequest) at marriage, we identiﬁed three sep-
arate processes that determine assets brought to marriage. The ﬁrst process is assortative matching,
that is, the tendency for wealthier brides to marry wealthier grooms. Assortative matching generates
a positive correlation between assets brought to marriage by both spouses. The second process is com-
pensating parental transfers at marriage. If these transfers are partly determined by marriage market
outcomes, assets brought by, say, a bride will have a negative eﬀect on assets brought by the groom once
we control for individual characteristics of the groom. The reason is that parents adjust their transfers
to compensate for marriage market outcomes. The third process is what we called strategic behavior,
that is, parents’ attempt to improve marriage market outcomes by giving more assets to their children.
Using detailed data from rural Ethiopia, we examined marriage patterns for evidence of these three
processes. Like other studies, we found overwhelming evidence of assortative matching. We test for
evidence of sibling competition but do not ﬁnd any: spouses with lots of siblings do not bring less to
marriage than those without. This is probably because two eﬀects cancel each other: competition between
siblings for parental resources should reduce assets brought to marriage, but risk sharing and other sibling
externalities increase them. Moreover, it is possible that wealthier parents will have larger completed
family sizes so parental wealth is correlated with the number of siblings.
We have also investigated parental transfers at marriage. At ﬁr s tg l a n c e ,t h ef a c tt h a tg r o o m sb r i n g
on average ten times more to marriage than brides is consistent with the idea that parental transfers at
19marriage depend on marriage market outcomes. Indeed, one may argue that it is because grooms bring
more that brides bring less. If true, this relationship should also hold at the individual level: a bride
who marries a poor groom should receive more from her parents to compensate for her lack of luck in
the marriage market. We develop a way of testing this idea formally but ﬁnd no evidence that this is the
case. Parents do not adjust their transfers to compensate for marriage market outcomes.
Finally, we tested whether Ethiopian parents behave strategically when they endow their children. If
they do, parents who face a steeper marriage matching curve would give more than parents whose gifts
would have little or no inﬂuence on marriage prospects. Having obtained estimates of the slope of the
marriage matching curve, we ﬁnd some evidence that parents behave strategically when they marry a
daughter, but not when they marry a son.
This paper helps clarify the determinants of assets brought to marriage in a world where these assets
have a decisive inﬂuence on subsequent household welfare. The results presented here need to be veriﬁed
in other settings and with larger data sets before they are deemed fully conclusive. But the methodology
developed in these pages illustrates how this can be done.
Taken together, our work indicates that the marriage market model provides a reasonable approxi-
mation of what goes on in rural Ethiopia. To complete the picture, one would need to know how much
social mobility there is after marriage, e.g., how fast households can accumulate assets, and how easily
they can switch to higher income paths. Given the predominantly agrarian nature of the surveyed area
and the relative lack of remunerative non-farm activities, we suspect that social mobility is low. This
issue deserves more investigation.
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22Table 2. Composition of the sample by category of household
Percent Number Unmarried individuals
5.1% 72 Single man living alone
16.8% 239 Single woman living alone
21.9% Monogamous couples
61.8% 877 Monogamous couple living together
4.9% 69 Monogamous couple, husband away
3.9% 55 Monogamous couple, wife away
70.5% Polygamous households
5.7% 81 Polygamous household living together
1.5% 21 Male headed part of a polygamous couple residing separately
0.4% 6 Female headed part of a polygamous couple residing separately
7.6%
1420 TotalTable 3.  Assets at marriage, Inheritance, Human Capital, and Parental Characteristics
Bride's assets Groom's assets
Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Assets brought to marriage:
0 833 90 377 5955 2056 Land value
0 1790 300 287 2833 1337 Livestock value
0 232 40 448 1587 877 Jewelry, clothes, linens, utensils and grain
0 2035 430 1981 7433 4270 Total value of assets prior to marriage
0 885 401 0 761 234 Gifts at marriage (1)
Inheritance after marriage:
0 657 75 0 8452 2060 Inherited land
0 346 80 0 1038 260 Inherited livestock
342 2395 987 3576 11848 6820 Total assets at marriage plus inheritance
Human capital
18.3 8.1 19.3 27.3 11.7 29.9 Age at marriage
0% 13% 0% 33% Literate (2)
0% 10% 0% 25% At least some primary education
0% 2% 0% 7% At least some secondary education
1.0 5.8 3.7 10.0 10.3 11.7 Years of farming experience
0.0 0.7 0.1 0.0 2.5 0.7 Years of wage work experience
0.0 1.5 0.3 0.0 2.9 0.8 Years of self-employment experience
Parental characteristics
0.4 9.9 1.9 0.6 74.0 6.5 Father's land (in hectares)
0% 7% 0% 7% Father went to school (yes=1)
1179 No. of observations
All unions included. All values expressed in 1997 Ethiopian Birr.
(1) Gifts made to bride and groom only. A few gifts given to both jointly are divided equally for the purpose of this table.
(2) Either some formal education or some literacy or religious education.Bride Groom Table 4. Assets brought to marriage
in logs in levels in logs in levels
t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. Assets brought by spouse
4.46 0.355 4.31 0.06 7.09 0.247 5.73 0.90 Value of assets brought by spouse (*)
Determinants of parental and personal wealth
2.59 0.598 0.15 0.57 1.69 0.175 1.72 14.51 Land of father (*)
-0.79 -0.595 -1.60 -634.42 -0.08 -0.027 0.20 168.92 Years of education of father
-0.39 -0.000 -0.13 -0.06 2.70 0.023 3.42 77.44 Age at marriage
5.79 1.159 5.00 522.30 1.57 0.130 0.82 176.85 Number of previous union
-0.63 -0.111 -0.93 -87.85 0.83 0.037 1.80 208.13 Years of schooling
0.83 0.761 -0.03 -15.54 -3.31 -0.459 -2.72 -987.85 Log of years of wage work experience
1.71 0.830 0.77 200.00 1.63 0.220 1.00 353.33 Log of years of self-employment exper.
included but not shown Village x decade dummies
0.73 0.858 -0.37 -206.8 3.84 3.018 -1.67 -3395.9 Intercept
5.100 2596.8 2.513 6504.5 Selection-term
0.130 0.037 0.041 0.011 Pseudo R-squared
1150 1150 993 993 Number of observations
701 701 90 90 of which censored
449 449 903 903 of which uncensored
(*) in log regressions, land of father and assets brought by spouse appear in log (x+1).Bride Groom Table 5. Testing sibling effects
in logs in levels in logs in levels
t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. Assets brought by spouse
2.93 0.436 1.85 0.06 4.98 0.280 1.61 0.37 Value of assets brought by spouse (*)
Determinants of parental and personal wealth
0.13 0.059 -0.44 -6.87 0.16 0.026 1.76 25.54 Land of father (*)
-0.75 -0.560 -1.57 -622.66 -0.07 -0.024 0.08 71.14 Years of education of father
-0.47 -0.000 -0.12 -0.06 2.84 0.025 3.07 70.78 Age at marriage
5.90 1.183 5.12 537.75 1.61 0.134 0.79 169.64 Number of previous union
-0.62 -0.109 -0.94 -87.98 0.79 0.035 1.69 195.28 Years of schooling
0.88 0.800 -0.04 -20.40 -3.40 -0.472 -2.59 -939.37 Log of years of wage work experience
1.70 0.824 0.75 195.66 1.61 0.217 0.91 320.72 Log of years of self-employment exper.
Sibling effects
0.42 0.455 0.82 191.33 0.14 0.026 -0.72 -279.39 Log of number of brothers
1.40 0.604 0.49 7.27 1.19 0.160 -0.86 -6.66 ln(# of brothers) x land of father (*)
-0.69 -0.097 -0.13 -0.00 -0.80 -0.038 3.15 0.80 ln(# of brothers) x assets brought by bride (*)
included but not shown Village x decade dummies
0.32 0.481 -0.66 -404.4 3.65 2.992 -1.40 -2954.1 Intercept
5.075 2593.2 2.511 6466.6 Selection-term
0.132 0.038 0.042 0.012 Pseudo R-squared
1149 1149 993 993 Number of observations
700 700 90 90 of which censored
449 449 903 903 of which uncensored
p-value F-test p-value F-test
0.87 0.4576 0.43 0.7316 0.5426 0.72 0.0149 3.51 Test whether sibling effects jointly significant
(*) in log regressions, land of father and assets brought by spouse appear in log (also in the cross terms).Table 6. Instrumenting assets brought by the spouse
Bride Groom
in logs in levels in logs in levels
t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. Assets brought by spouse
0.22 0.031 2.14 0.06 1.54 0.081 3.46 1.51 Value of assets brought by spouse (*),(**)
Determinants of parental and personal wealth
2.51 0.596 0.13 0.50 1.67 0.178 1.63 13.90 Land of father (*)
-0.59 -0.447 -1.76 -708.98 -0.14 -0.046 0.09 80.93 Years of education of father
-0.40 -0.000 -0.23 -0.11 2.42 0.022 3.42 78.03 Age at marriage
5.54 1.123 5.18 546.20 1.77 0.150 0.83 181.52 Number of previous union
-0.71 -0.127 -1.06 -100.35 1.17 0.053 1.85 216.89 Years of schooling
1.02 0.935 -0.05 -24.05 -2.77 -0.393 -2.72 -998.82 Log of years of wage work experience
1.52 0.754 0.85 222.46 1.67 0.231 1.20 426.65 Log of years of self-employment exper.
included but not shown Village x decade dummies
1.82 2.623 -0.37 -207.9 4.39 3.610 -1.69 -3469.1 Intercept
5.182 2625.8 2.575 6571.0 Selection-term
0.125 0.04 0.031 0.01 Pseudo R-squared
1152 1152 993 993 Number of observations
702 702 90 90 of which censored
450 450 903 903 of which uncensored
(*) in log regressions, land of father and assets brought by spouse appear in log (x+1).
(**) instrumented; see text for details.Bride Groom Table 7. Including slope effects
in logs in levels in logs in levels
t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. Assets brought by spouse
0.09 0.01 2.18 0.06 1.40 0.07 5.70 0.90 Value of assets brought by spouse (*),(**)
Determinants of parental and personal wealth
2.60 0.61 0.22 0.81 1.68 0.18 1.66 14.20 Land of father (*)
-0.94 -0.71 -1.92 -778.92 -0.10 -0.03 0.11 95.35 Years of education of father
-0.60 -0.00 -0.35 -0.17 2.41 0.02 3.42 78.08 Age at marriage
5.33 1.07 5.05 534.31 1.79 0.15 0.84 182.54 Number of previous union
-0.65 -0.11 -1.03 -97.03 1.18 0.05 1.85 216.79 Years of schooling
1.19 1.10 0.02 12.53 -2.67 -0.38 -2.67 -983.78 Log of years of wage work experience
1.12 0.56 0.66 174.43 1.67 0.23 1.20 425.86 Log of years of self-employment exper.
Slope effect
3.78 4.48 1.96 1210.9 -1.32 -10.45 -0.55 -11084 Slope of matching function (***),(**)
Village x decade dummies
1.54 2.22 -0.61 -350.4 4.31 4.43 -1.03 -2630.7 Intercept
5.14 2627.6 2.57 6570.0 Selection-term
0.13 0.04 0.03 0.01 Pseudo R-squared
1152 1152 993 993 Number of observations
702 702 90 90 of which censored
450 450 903 903 of which uncensored
(*) in log regressions, land of father and assets brought by spouse appear in log (x+1).
(**) instrumented; see text for details.
(***) estimated using hypothetical matching; see text for details.